Academic Freedom and Homeland Security

Security analysts and policy makers have been concerned with information published in the open scientific literature since WWII and the Cold War. Recently the focus has shifted towards information and research in the biosciences because of the dramatic advances and potential application of this information to bioterrorism. The likelihood of government-imposed restraints on the dissemination of scientific information is of great concern to the academic research community and has become a delicate subject between national security officials and the academic community.

Some arguments for and against restricting publication of "sensitive" research were outlined at a recent conference hosted by the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Arguments for restricting publication include: scientific advances available in the open scientific literature could assist in the development of new types weapons used for bioterrorism. (A report on the Workshop on Guidelines for the Publication of Scientific Research Potentially Related to Biological and Toxin Warfare is available at: http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/)

Those arguments against restricting publication include: restricting the publication of research contradicts the norms of the scientific community and impedes advances, restricting publication would discourage long-term efforts in areas that could be open to censorship, and controls on scientific knowledge could create an artificial sense of security and delay research needed to develop countermeasures.

At the recent Federal Biodefense Research FY 2003 Conference, Ronald Atlas, President of the American Society for Microbiology, addressed some of the concerns of the academic community especially in microbiology. For instance, he said it is only legal to possess certain agents or pathogens for “bona fide” research (per USA Patriot Act). This may lead to two questions: (1) what constitutes “bona fide” research and (2) does research that one plans for the future constitute “bona fide” research or justify keeping restricted pathogens in a lab freezer?

Another major concern is nothing clearly defines "sensitive information" in the life sciences, Atlas said. Many controversial papers that have been published could be construed as providing dangerous information, he said. However, the free flow of information is important in the academic community, especially across national boundaries, as international collaborations and partnerships are sought.

Atlas provided additional questions that strike at the center of this debate:

• Should scientists be constrained regarding which questions they can ask?
• Should journals reject papers containing potentially sensitive information?
• Should secrecy clearances be required for attendees at biodefense research meetings?
• Should there be mandatory government review before publishing information, even from unclassified studies and those not funded by government?
• And, perhaps the most difficult questions of all, exactly what is sensitive information, and who is empowered to decide what is potentially dangerous?

Atlas urged the scientific community to come together to establish the norms, standards and a framework to ensure that critical information is withheld from terrorists while continuing the advancement of biomedical research. This cannot be done alone and a dialogue must be established with the national security community.