state revenue

The researchers use a panel of aggregated state-level tax data to estimate the effects of tax policy on entrepreneurship. State tax policy, including both tax rates and the type of taxes in a state’s portfolio, has only a modest effect on aggregate state entrepreneurship rates.

The authors employ propensity score matching and a traditional control function approach to examine the impact of participation in various societal institutions on microfirm performance in Mexico. They find that firms that participate in credit markets, receive training, pay taxes, and belong to business associations exhibit significantly higher profits, even after controlling for the various factors that drive participation in those institutions.

This article analyzes the QBIC program, introduced in Quebec to help capitalize SME. The authors analyze the ownership of all the QBICs accredited between 1998 and 2003, and the operating performance of the 83 financed companies for which accounting data were available.

This research provides an exhaustive review of U.S. property tax abatement programs and identifies and compares critical structural differences of abatement programs across states. Program differences are much greater than the existing literature recognizes.

The authors study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, they analyze incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries.

The study finds the majority of tax abatement programs offered by local and state governments to stimulate economic growth are overly generous.

The author constructs a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also invest in socially productive public goods.

The paper exploits the cross-sectional and time-series variation in R&D tax credits, and in turn the user cost of R&D, available from U.S. states between 1981-2002 to
estimate the elasticity of private R&D with respect to both the within-state (internal) user cost and the out-of-state (external) user cost.

Using models of legislative choice, the authors show that Congress could not finance projects that provided benefits to a minority of districts while spreading the taxes over all.

This paper studies the effects of distortionary taxes and public investment in an endogenous growth OLG model with knowledge transmission. It is shown that Ramsey-optimal policies reduce savings due to high tax rates on young generations, and are not necessarily growth-improving with respect to a pure private system