state revenue

This paper reviews what we know from economic theory and evidence about who bears the burden of the corporate income tax.

Analysis of the 2000 Swiss census data provides evidence for fiscally-induced migration within Switzerland, particularly with respect to a location choice of highly skilled immigrants.

The analysis contrasts results of two recently expounded micro-level data approaches to derive robust intertemporal characterizations of redistributional effects of income tax schedules; the fixed-income procedure of Kasten, Sammartino and Toder (1994) and the transplant-and-compare method of Dardanoni and Lambert (2002).

This paper assesses the extent and policy implications of simultaneous competition among countries on both corporate tax rates and the provision of public goods used by firms as production factors.

This paper assesses the extent and policy implications of simultaneous competition among countries on both corporate tax rates and the provision of public goods used by firms as production factors.

This paper provides empirical evidence of a more favorable tax treatment for foreign multinationals compared to similar domestic Firms in a small open economy. Using treatment effects to control for self-selection of foreign firms into low tax firms, the authors find that foreign multinationals have substantially lower effective tax rates compared to domestic firms.

A global multi-sectoral, multi-regional computational general equilibrium model is employed to assess carbon taxes under perfect competition and monopoly. The study finds that regional studies of carbon taxation maybe inaccurate due to the carbon emission spillover effects.

Tax incentives are common instruments in regional policies used to attract new investments and promote increase in employment and income, but the impact on regional public finances is very controversial. This paper uses an interregional computable general equilibrium model for the Brazilian economy to evaluate the net effects of tax incentives on the regional government revenues. The model takes into account the structural relationships between two regions and the specific characteristics of the Brazilian federalism that affects regional public finances.

The authors analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings. Governments are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies before firms decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively.

This article attempts a formal analysis of the connection between property tax and urban sprawl in U.S. cities. The authors develop a theoretical model that includes households (who are also landlords) and land developers in a regional land market. They then test the model empirically based on a national sample of urbanized areas. The results obtained from both theoretical and empirical analyses indicate that increasing property tax rates reduces the size of urbanized areas.