r&d

This paper describes a classroom exercise that illustrates the investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present.

This paper investigates the incidence of national and cross-border M&A on industrial R&D investment in OECD countries over the period 1990-1999. Findings show that the last M&A wave contributed to expand domestic R&D activities, especially in high-technology intensive industries.

The authors characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature.

The authors demonstrate that the presumed incompatibility of uncoordinated R&D and competition is not fundamental, but hinges on the nature of R&D spillovers. As a consequence, R&D subsidies may be more effective than previously thought, according to the authors

The paper investigates the links between the nature of contractual relationships within firms, the strength of information flows spreading between firms and the dynamics of technological competition.

The author utilizes a large matched employer-employee data set and test for knowledge diffusion from subsidised technology firms transmitted through the labor market.

The author presents an endogenous growth model that studies the effects of local inter-industry and intra-industry knowledge spillovers in R&D on the allocation of economic activities between two regions.

Using panels of UK and U.S. firms matched to patent data, the authors show that UK firms who had established a high proportion of U.S.-based inventors by 1990 benefited disproportionately from the growth of the U.S. research and development (R&D) stock over the next 10 years.

Using panels of UK and U.S. firms matched to patent data, the authors show that UK firms who had established a high proportion of U.S.-based inventors by 1990 benefited disproportionately from the growth of the U.S. research and development (R&D) stock over the next 10 years.

The authors develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development in which one research unit with an innovative idea bargains to license her nonverifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing development units.